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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FREE SPEECH AND GENETICALLY
MODIFIED FOOD LABELING: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR
DETERMINING THE CONTROVERSIAL CHARACTER OF
COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Richard W. Keidel *
Food is an inextricable ingredient of life. Today, food
manufacturers use modes of genetic modification to produce
foodstuffs. As a result of the citizenry’s increased awareness of
this fact, states are requiring food manufacturers to disclose
which of their products are genetically modified. However,
within the context of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, state-mandated labeling of genetically modified
food stands on an infirm foothold. The constitutionality of
these disclosure requirements turns on whether state-mandated,
genetically modified food labels are uncontroversial.
Moreover, under the commercial speech doctrine, it is unclear
how a court should assess and what a court should examine to
determine whether compelled commercial speech is
controversial. This Note proposes that (1) a court should
examine the speech’s tendency to advance a controversial
ideology, and (2) a court can assess the speech’s tendency to
advance a controversial ideology by determining if the speech is
relevant to a normative value and whether the speech’s
normative force outweighs its informative force. This Note
concludes that state-mandated, genetically modified food labels
are controversial; therefore, the commercial speech doctrine’s
more lenient form of means-end scrutiny is inapposite in
analyzing state disclosure requirements that concern genetically
modified food.

INTRODUCTION
Spensley Rickert and his wife live in the Pioneer Valley.1 Like
* B.A., Philosophy, Washington College, 2012; J.D. Candidate, Western New
England University School of Law, 2016. This Note is dedicated to my late father,
Richard J. Keidel, Esq., whose dedication to law and family inspires me every day.
Many thanks to Taylor Flynn for her guidance and mentorship, and to Jeanne Kaiser
for her comments on an earlier draft of this Note. Also, special thanks to the editors
and staff of Western New England Law Review, particularly Dan Benoit, Mark
Squires, Jessica Scouten, Heather Harris, and Jennifer Weekley.
1. For the basis of this introduction, see Tom Vannah, Between the Lines:
47
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many others in the Pioneer Valley, Mr. Rickert is a farmer by
trade.2 Armed with a degree in agriculture from Cornell and a
whole lifetime of farming experience, Mr. Rickert operates the
Hatfield Feed & Seed—a small farm located in North Hatfield,
Massachusetts, just off of Interstate 91.3 The Hatfield Feed & Seed
implements environmentally sustainable practices and produces
organic foodstuffs.4 These two distinct features of the Hatfield
Feed & Seed are dear not only to Mr. Rickert, but they are also
important to consumers.5 Mr. Rickert explains that twenty-first
century consumers are different from those of a bygone era:
“[t]oday consumers are attuned to labels that indicate, in fairly
specific terms, how various foodstuffs are produced . . . .”6 In the
Pioneer Valley, in the greater New England region, and on a
national level, considerations ranging from health, to food safety,
to climate change are all driving the focus on food.7
Consumers are specifically interested in a particular label—the
However, an
genetically modified (“GM”)8 food label.9
information divide with respect to food identification allegedly

Practically Organic, VALLEY ADVOCATE, October 15, 2014, at 7. “The Pioneer Valley
region contains three counties in Western Massachusetts with the Connecticut River
running down the middle.” RANDY GORDON ET AL., A MONUMENTAL HISTORY OF
THE PIONEER VALLEY 3 (2009).
2. Vannah, supra note 1, at 7.
3. Vannah, supra note 1, at 7.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. Id. “[L]ocal food is making a comeback; locavores look for locally grown or
raised food, and other epicurean consumers seek organic and naturally produced
food.” David J. Berg, Food Choice Is A Fundamental Liberty Right, 9 J. FOOD L. &
POL’Y 173, 175 (2013).
7. See ALEX RIGLEY SCHROEDER, MASSACHUSETTS WORKFORCE ALLIANCE,
LOCAL FOOD, LOCAL JOBS: JOB GROWTH AND CREATION IN THE PIONEER VALLEY
FOOD
SYSTEM,
11
(Deborah
Mutschler,
Feb.
2013),
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/agr/boards-commissions/mwa-food-report-03062013screen.pdf [http://perma.cc/55EQ-BF6X].
8. A note on terminology: this Note will employ the full term “genetic
modification” as a noun, and “GM” as an adjective, e.g., GM tomatoes.
9. Genetic modification is “[t]he alteration of an organism’s genome by human
intervention, by introducing, modifying, or eliminating specific genes.” PAMELA C.
RONALD & RAOUL W. ADAMCHAK, TOMORROW’S TABLE: ORGANIC FARMING,
GENETICS, AND THE FUTURE OF FOOD 172 (2008). See James Maryanski, Testimony
before the H. Subcomm. on Basic Scientific Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMINISTRATION
(Oct.
19,
1999),
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm115032.htm
[http://perma.cc/B37HCKMM] (last updated Aug. 06, 2009) (“The United States uses the term genetic
modification to refer to all forms of breeding, both modern, i.e., genetic engineering,
and conventional.”).
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sunders the symbiotic relationship between food producers and
consumers.10 As consumers prowl the aisles of the local grocery
store, it can be difficult to differentiate GM foodstuffs from nonGM foodstuffs.11 As a result, Massachusetts’s voters took political
action in order to ameliorate the information divide.
On January 13, 2015, several Massachusetts politicians filed a
GM food-labeling bill, House Bill 369, in the Massachusetts
legislature for the 2015–2016 legislative season.12 The bill has four
chief sponsors—two of the four, Representatives Ellen Story and
Todd Smola, speak on behalf of the Pioneer Valley.13 Moreover,
House Bill 369 is specifically modeled after Vermont’s GM foodlabeling law,14 which is currently fraught with legal opposition by
food producers and members of the biotechnology community.
Thus, Massachusetts should expect substantially similar legal
challenges if or when House Bill 369 becomes law.
In the litigation concerning Vermont’s GM food-labeling law,
food producers and members of the biotechnology community
claim violations of their free speech rights under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.15 One of the
pivotal issues concerning this claim is whether governmentmandated labeling of GM foodstuffs is uncontroversial commercial
speech. This inquiry could be a double-edged blade—not only
could it determine the applicable mode of means-end scrutiny,16 but
the applicable mode of means-end scrutiny could be determinative
of the constitutionality of Vermont’s GM food-labeling law.17

10. See Berg, supra note 6, at 175.
11. However, non-GM foodstuffs need not necessarily be “organic.” See Miles
McEvoy, Organic 101: Can GMOs Be Used in Organic Products?, U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC. (May 17, 2013, 1:20 PM), http://blogs.usda.gov/2013/05/17/organic-101-cangmos-be-used-in-organic-products/ (setting out the standard for organic products).
12. H.D. 369, 189th Gen. Court (Mass. 2015); see also GMO Labeling Bill Just
Introduced in New Legislative Session: Help Recruit Co-sponsors, MA RIGHT TO
KNOW GMOS (Jan. 13, 2015), http://marighttoknow.com/home/newsession
[http://perma.cc/MJQ3-57AD].
13. Fact Sheet, Massachusetts GMO Labeling Legislation, MASSACHUSETTS
COALITION FOR GMO LABELING 2 (Jan. 14, 2015), http://marighttoknow.com/
home/legislative-support/ma-legislation/ [http://perma.cc/JG9E-CGHE].
14. Id.
15. See Complaint, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-00117-cr (D.Vt.
June 12, 2014), ECF No. 1.
16. “Means-end scrutiny is an analytical process involving examination of the
purposes (ends) which conduct is designed to serve and the methods (means) chosen to
further those purposes.” Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Means-End Scrutiny in American
Constitutional Law, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 449, 449 (1988).
17. See, e.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996)
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Moreover, the doctrine on this issue is unsettled; “it is unclear
how [a court] should assess and what [a court] should examine to
determine whether a mandatory disclosure is controversial.”18 This
Note adds to the literature on this topic in two ways.19 First, this
Note pinpoints the substance that a court should examine in
determining
whether compelled
commercial speech
is
controversial. Second, by drawing on concepts from the Federal
Rules of Evidence and building upon Professor Ellen Goodman’s
“germaneness requirement,”20 this Note offers an analytical tool to
determine whether compelled commercial speech is controversial.
The guiding forces behind this Note’s analysis are the constitutional
value at the heart of the commercial speech doctrine and the
scientific and societal factors that make GM foods a hot-button
topic.
Part I of this Note discusses the broad principles that underpin
the debate surrounding GM foods. Specifically, Part I.A. discusses
the relevant scientific principles and historical context behind GM
food. Part I.B sets out and analyzes the statutory framework of
Vermont’s GM food-labeling law, the same legislation upon which
House Bill 369 is based.
Part II briefly sketches the important constitutional principles
that underpin the legal dispute over state-mandated GM food
labeling. Part II.A. provides the theoretical justifications for the
free speech guarantee. Part II.B. discusses the doctrinal principles
surrounding the free speech guarantee and commercial speech.
Part II.C. asserts that GM food labeling is compelled commercial
speech, and is thereby afforded some degree of constitutional
protection under the free speech guarantee. Part II.D. discusses
the primary modes of means-end analysis that are applicable to
commercial speech, and analyzes why the distinction between the
two forms of scrutiny is important for GM food-labeling laws.
Part III sets out the gravamen of this Note. Specifically, Part
III.A. argues that a GM food label is purely factual compelled
commercial speech, and therefore satisfies the first threshold
requirement for less exacting judicial scrutiny. Part III.B. argues
(holding that Vermont could not compel dairy producers to disclose whether their
products contain rGBH, a type of GM hormone).
18. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
19. See Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the
Constitutional Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 568 (2014)
(There is little scholarship on compelled commercial speech).
20. Id. at 553.
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that GM food labeling is not uncontroversial compelled
commercial speech, and therefore fails to satisfy the second
threshold requirement for less exacting judicial scrutiny. This Part
also pinpoints the substance that a court should examine in
determining
whether compelled
commercial speech
is
controversial, and offers an analytical mechanism for evaluating the
relevant substantive information.
I.

SCIENCE, HISTORY, AND STATUTES

To properly appreciate this Note’s proposal, it is necessary to
examine the scientific principles of genetic modification and the
relevant historical development of genetic modification.
A. Scientific Principles & Historical Context
Humans have used rudimentary methods of genetic
modification to produce food for thousands of years.21 For
instance, the prehistoric inhabitants of the Balsas River basin in
Mexico developed modern corn (maize) from teosinte, a wild,
stone-like form of grass, about nine thousand years ago.22 In so
doing, these early farmers would choose teosinte that had superior
kernel quality, large size and better taste, then save and plant their
seeds for future harvest.23
This ancient process, which is known as artificial selection, is
man’s first known feat of genetic modification.24 Due to our long
history of artificially shaping organisms for consumption,25 “[m]any
of our common crops—including rice, wheat, corn, and beans—
cannot reproduce themselves without human help . . . .”26 Thus,
humans have a long-rooted, symbiotic relationship with food by
virtue of our historical use of artificial selection. It is of no surprise
that Charles Darwin devoted the entire first chapter of On the

21. Brooke Glass-O’Shea, The History and Future of Genetically Modified
Crops: Frankenfoods, Superweeds, & the Developing World, 7 J. FOOD. L. & POL’Y 1,
3 (2011).
22. Nina V. Redoroff, Prehistoric GM Corn, 302 SCIENCE, NEW SERIES, no.
5648, Nov. 14, 2003, at 1158, 1158–59; The Evolution of Corn, UNIV. UTAH HEALTH
SCIENCES, http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/selection/corn/ [http://perma.cc/
UFK6-KKQF] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
23. Redoroff, supra note 22, at 1158.
24. Id.
25. Glenn Davis Stone, The Anthropology of Genetically Modified Crops, 39
ANN. R. ANTHROPOL. 381, 383 (2010).
26. Glass-O’Shea, supra note 21, at 3.
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Origin of Species to this process.27
The advent of modern science has advanced humans’ ability to
alter the genetic makeup of organisms. In general, genetic
modification refers to distinct subcategories of modalities that
scientists use to alter organisms for future consumption.28 One
subcategory of genetic modification is genetic engineering, which
“involves making an intentional targeted change in a plant or
animal gene sequence to effect a specific result . . . through the use
of recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (rDNA) technology.”29
Genetic engineering was developed in the early-1970s, when
Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer discovered the process of genesplicing or recombinant-DNA modification.30
Genetic
engineering’s first breakthrough was the therapeutic drug Humulin,
a form of insulin that is regularly taken by diabetics worldwide.31
The first foodstuff produced by means of genetic engineering was
the Flavr Savr tomato, which was approved by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration in 1994.32 Flavr Savr’s genetic modification
was a significant breakthrough because the modification delayed
rotting and increased flavor.33
Another subcategory of genetic modification is biotechnology,
which encompasses contemporary methods of modification, such as
somatic hybridization (protoplast fusion), embryo rescue,
somaclonal variation, mutation breeding, and cell selection.34
Specifically, protoplast fusion is a process whereby “cells growing
in a culture medium are stripped of their protective walls, usually
using pectinase, cellulase, and hemicellulase enzymes. These
stripped cells, called protoplasts, are pooled from different sources
and, through the use of varied techniques such as electrical shock,
are fused with one another.”35
The resulting plant has
27. Jeffrey K. Connor, Artificial Selection: A Powerful Tool for Ecologists, 84
ECOLOGY 1650, 1650 (2003).
28. SAFETY OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING
& ASSESSING UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS ON
HUMAN HEALTH, INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L
ACADS. 18 (2004).
29. Id.
30. Glass-O’Shea, supra note 21, at 8.
31. Id.
32. See Stone, supra note 25, at 382. See also Premarket Notice Concerning
Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706, 4707–08 (proposed Jan. 18, 2001) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192 & 592) (discussing the Flavr Savr tomato).
33. See Stone, supra note 25, at 382.
34. SAFETY OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, supra note 28, at 18, 24–28.
35. Id. at 26.
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characteristics from both parents—protoplast fusion is
hybridization at the vegetative level.36 Although it is not the most
precise methods of modern genetic modification,37 protoplast
fusion is viewed as a viable method of genetic modification for
some industries.38 For instance, it is sometimes used in the
production of tobacco.39
Another subcategory of genetic modification is conventional
breeding, which denotes “traditional methods of breeding, or
crossing, plants, animals, or microbes with certain desired
characteristics for the purpose of generating offspring that express
those characteristics.”40 For instance, artificial selection is a form of
conventional breeding.41 Seeds from a plant with desirable
characteristics are preserved for future harvest; thus, the crops of
the future harvest tend to possess the superior characteristics of the
progenitor plant.42 Despite its vintage, modern technology has
helped enhance artificial selection’s productivity.43
Unsurprisingly, American farmers began cultivating GM
crops with beneficial traits, such as, herbicide tolerance and insect
resistance.44 Despite the benefits of GM crops for farmers,
consumers became quite skeptical of GM food production and
consumption over the last decade.45
B. The Statutory Framework: Vermont’s GM Food-Labeling Law
General skepticism of GM food is not uncommon in American

36. Laszlo Menczel et al., Effect of Radiation Dosage on Efficiency of
Chloroplast Transfer By Protoplast Fusion in Nicotiana, 100 GENETICS 487, 487 (1982).
37. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg.
22984 (May 29, 1992) (“Mutagenesis techniques are limited, however, by their inability
to target a desired trait.”).
38. See Menczel et al., supra note 36, at 487 (“Protoplast fusion offers the
possibility of one-step transfer of organelles between plant species, replacing the
tedious procedure involving repeated back-crosses.”).
39. Id.
40. SAFETY OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, supra note 28, at 24.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Stone, supra note 25, at 382.
45. Anton E. Wohlers, Regarding Genetically Modified food: Policy Trajectories,
Political Culture, & Risk Perceptions in the U.S., Canada & EU, 29 POL. & LIFE SCI.
17, 23 (2010). “Concerns have focused on the capacity of genetically modified foods to
cross biological boundaries, causing harm to humans and the environment. However,
resistance also stems from the post-material values movement of the 1960s and
1970s . . . .” Id. at 17.
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society.46 A logical outgrowth of society’s suspicion is the specific
issue of government-mandated labeling of GM foodstuffs.47 Before
House Bill 369 was introduced in Massachusetts, the citizenry of
Vermont expressed its will on the issue of GM food labeling by
means of the democratic process.48 Moreover, title 9, sections 3041
through 3048 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated (“labeling law”)
codify Vermont’s labeling requirements for GM foods.49 Five
aspects of the labeling law are particularly relevant for this Note’s
discussion.
First, the operative term of Vermont’s labeling law is genetic
engineering.50
For purposes of the labeling law, genetic
engineering is (1) a process, (2) by which a foodstuff that is
intended for human consumption is produced, (3) from an
organism, and (4) the organism’s genetic material has been
changed through the application of either (A) “in vitro nucleic acid
techniques,” (B) cell fusion, or (C) “hybridization techniques that
overcome natural physiological, reproductive, or recombination
barriers.”51
Note well—the labeling law’s definition of genetic engineering
sits in contrast to the more narrow definition of genetic
engineering.52 But, as a matter of black letter law, “when a
legislature defines the language it uses, its definition is binding . . .
even though the definition does not coincide with the ordinary
meaning of the words.”53 In this vein, a word is merely “the skin of
a living thought”; a word’s meaning can vary depending on the
circumstances in which it is used.54 Hence, what matters most is the
46. See id.; see also Glass-O’Shea, supra note 21, at 16 (questioning citizens’
fright of GM foods).
47. See Travis Nunziato, “You Say Tomato, I Say Solanum Lycopersicum
Containing Beta-ionone and Phenylacetaldehyde”: An Analysis of Connecticut’s GMO
Labeling Legislation, 69 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 471, 481 (2014) (“[T]he labeling of
genetically modified food is of great interest to consumers in the United States.”).
48. George A. Nation III, We the People: The Consent of the Governed in the
Twenty-First Century: The People’s Unalienable Right to Make Law, 4 DREXEL L.
REV. 319, 329 (2012) (stating that the only legitimate source of governmental power is
the people). “In a representative democracy, the people do not exercise their power to
govern directly; rather, they periodically delegate their authority to an agent or
representative.” Id.
49. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3041–48 (2014) (effective July 1, 2016).
50. See id. § 3042(4)(A)–(B).
51. Id.
52. See discussion supra Part I.A.
53. 1A NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 20:8 (7th ed. 2007).
54. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
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flesh behind the skin—in this case, the intent of the legislature.55
The labeling law’s definition of genetic engineering is conceptually
congruent to the United States’ conception of genetic
modification.56 In light of this similarity, the intent of the Vermont
legislature is clear; notwithstanding the use of the term genetic
engineering, the labeling law’s operative term codifies the essential
meaning of genetic modification.
Second, if a foodstuff meets the labeling law’s definition of
genetic engineering, and it is offered for retail sale in Vermont, the
foodstuff must be labeled as either produced entirely or in part
from genetic engineering.57 The duty of actually labeling the
foodstuff falls upon either the manufacturer or the retailer.58 Food
manufacturers are obligated to append the required label to the
packaging of both “raw agricultural commodities” and “processed
food.”59 On the other hand, food retailers are required to comply
with the labeling law only in the case of a raw agricultural
commodity that is not separately packaged.60
In such a
circumstance, the retailer of the food product is obligated to affix
the required label to “the retail store shelf or bin in which the
commodity is displayed for sale . . . .”61 Food retailers who prepare
food for immediate consumption, such as restaurants, are not
subject to the labeling law.62
Third, certain foods need not be labeled: “food consisting
entirely of or derived entirely from an animal that has not itself
been produced with genetic engineering”;63 processing aids and
enzymes;64 alcoholic beverages;65 processed foods that contain
55. See Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928)
(stating that it would be arbitrary to interpret a statute in a way that is contrary to
legislative intent that is supported by persuasive evidence).
56. James Maryanski, Testimony before the H. Subcomm. on Basic Scientific
Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 19, 1999), http://www.fda.gov/
newsevents/testimony/ucm115032.htm [http://perma.cc/B37H-CKMM] (last updated
Aug. 06, 2009) (explaining that “[t]he United States uses the term ‘genetic
modification’ to refer to all forms of breeding, both modern, i.e., genetic engineering,
and conventional”); see also supra Part I.A.
57. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3043(a)(1)–(2).
58. Id. §§ 3043(b)(1)–(3).
59. Id. §§ 3043(b)(1)–(3); see id. § 3042(10) (defining “raw agricultural
commodity”); id. § 3042(8) (defining “processed food”).
60. Id. § 3043(b)(2).
61. Id.
62. Id. §§ 3043(d)(1)–(2).
63. Id. § 3044(1).
64. Id. § 3044(3).
65. Id. § 3044(4).
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materials that, in the aggregate, account for no more than 0.9
percent of the processed food’s total weight;66 and “medical food.”67
Food
Fourth, the labeling law has four purposes.68
manufacturers or retailers must provide information regarding GM
food so that consumers can make informed commercial decisions in
light of (1) the potential health effects of GM food, (2) the
potential environmental effects of producing GM food, (3) certain
religious objections to the use and consumption of GM food, and
(4) the risk of consumer confusion and deception.69
On June 12, 2014, the Grocery Manufacturers Association
(“GMA”) filed suit for injunctive relief in federal district court
against Attorney General Sorrell (“Vermont”).70 GMA claims that
the Vermont labeling law is unconstitutional on several grounds.71
Specifically, GMA asserts that the labeling law contravenes the
First Amendment by unconstitutionally regulating commercial
speech.72 To fully appraise the gravity of this claim, this Note will
analyze the constitutional principles that underpin the legal dispute
over government-mandated labeling of GM foodstuffs.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees
the right of free speech.73 The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the free speech guarantee
against the several states.74 “The authors of the First Amendment
knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the
complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which they
believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph

66. Id. § 3044(5).
67. Id. § 3044(8); 21 U.S.C. § 360ee(b)(3) (2012) (defining “medical food”).
68. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3041(1)–(4).
69. Id.
70. See Terri Hallenbeck, Vermont Defends GMO Labeling Law, BURLINGTON
FREE PRESS, http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/politics/2014/08/08/gmolawsuit-response/13800873/ [http://perma.cc/4NWR-MYNU] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015)
(discussing the lawsuit that was filed against the State of Vermont in May 2014).
71. See Complaint at 13–21, Grocery Man. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-00117-cr
(D. Vt. June. 12, 2014), ECF No. 1.
72. See id. at 13–16.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
74. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); see Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937) (“[Freedom of speech is] implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the
states.”).
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over slothful ignorance.”75 In this light, the right of free speech
encompasses both the rights of speakers and listeners.76
Specifically, speakers enjoy the right to speak and the right against
being compelled to speak.77 Both rights are corollaries of the
broader concept of individual freedom of mind.78 Moreover,
listeners enjoy the right to receive speech.79 The right to receive
speech is just as important as the right to speak at all—“[t]he
dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing
addressees are not free to receive and consider them.”80 Even
before the ratification of the First Amendment in 1791, scholars,
jurists, and lawyers have sought to pinpoint the purpose of the right
of free speech.81
A. Theoretical Justifications for the Free Speech Guarantee
Today, there are “three classic free speech theories” that
account for the purpose of the free speech guarantee.82 First, the
“‘marketplace of ideas’ theory”83 justifies the right of free speech
on the basis that:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which [peoples’] wishes safely can
be carried out.84

In essence, the marketplace of ideas theory rests on the supposition
that free speech leads to the discovery of truth.85

75. Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
76. Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled
Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 966 (2009).
77. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
78. Id.
79. Martin, 319 U.S. at 143.
80. Lamont v. Postmaster General of U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). For a discussion of the right against compelled listening, which is
currently an unrecognized right under the free speech guarantee, see Corbin, supra
note 76, at 980 (arguing that the courts should recognize a First Amendment right
against compelled listening).
81. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A
TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 1.04 (1994) (discussing Blackstone’s narrow
conception of freedom of speech).
82. Id. § 2.01.
83. Id.
84. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
see also Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2288 (2012).
85. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15–16
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Second, the “‘democratic self-governance’ theory”86 justifies
the right of free speech on the ground that it “[i]s a necessary
component of a society premised on the assumption that the
population at large is sovereign.”87 By making possible an
informed electorate, and encouraging citizens to participate in the
political process, the right of freedom of speech fosters “the
formation of public opinion [which] is vital to the legitimacy of the
democratic state.”88 In essence, the democratic self-governance
theory rests on the supposition that “[d]emocracy subordinates
government to public opinion.”89
Third, the “‘human dignity and self-fulfillment’ theory”
justifies the right of free speech on the ground that it promotes
individual autonomy.90 Identifying individual autonomy as the
theoretical centerpiece of the free speech guarantee implicitly
recognizes the ultimate sanctity of individual choice and
expression.91 In essence, the human dignity and self-fulfillment
theory rests on the supposition that the right of free speech protects
“the inner life that [speech] expresses.”92 Nevertheless, these three
theories “should be understood, however, not as mutually
exclusive, but as mutually supportive rationales which combine to
make an overwhelming case for the elevation of freedom of speech
as a transcendent value in an open society.”93 The free speech
guarantee encompasses a broad array of constitutionally protected
rights for both speakers and listeners, and the theoretical
justifications for the free speech guarantee are manifold. Despite
the free speech guarantee’s expansive protections and sundry
philosophical justifications, it is beyond dispute that “[n]ot every
case is a first amendment case.”94 “Thus, only a certain category of
behavior is covered by the first amendment.”95 Next, this Note will
examine whether GM food labels fall within the category of
(1982).
86. SMOLLA, supra note 81, § 2.01.
87. SCHAUER, supra note 85, at 35.
88. Corbin, supra note 76, at 970.
89. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC
FREEDOM 35 (2012).
90. Corbin, supra note 76, at 970–71; see also SMOLLA, supra note 81, § 2.01.
91. SCHAUER, supra note 85, at 68.
92. Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1298
(2014); see also Corbin, supra note 76, at 972.
93. SMOLLA, supra note 81, § 2.01.
94. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 267 (1981).
95. Id.
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behavior that the First Amendment protects.
B. Determining the Correct Category
The free speech guarantee protects “speech as such.”96 This is
an extremely broad category—constitutional protection attaches to
any communicative act “whenever an intent to convey a
particularized message was present, and in the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it.”97 By implication, “the
constitutional definition of the word ‘speech’ carves out a category
that is not coextensive with the ordinary language meaning of the
word ‘speech.’”98 The critical principle in this respect is that “[t]he
First Amendment affords protection to symbolic or expressive
conduct as well as to actual speech.”99
In general, a communicative act that comes within the free
speech guarantee’s purview can be the subject of government
regulation only if the government satisfies strict scrutiny.100
However, not all speech regulations are categorically subject to
strict scrutiny—there are several exceptions to the general rule.101
For purposes of this Note, the most important genus consists of
speech that is characterized as either low value or devoid of any
protection.102 Specifically, this category consists of “certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.”103 Examples include “fighting words,”104
96. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 478 (1997) (Souter,
J., dissenting).
97. Robert C. Post, Essay, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1249, 1251 (1995) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974)).
98. Schauer, supra note 94, at 273; see id. at 269 (recognizing that, in general,
constitutional language is a form of technical language that should be interpreted in its
unique context and with reference to its particular purposes).
99. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003).
100. See Matthew D. Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First
Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349,
351 (2011).
101. Id. at 357 (explaining that strict scrutiny is not applicable if (1) the speech
regulation is classified as content neutral, (2) the regulated speech is characterized as
either “low value or devoid of any protection,” (3) the declarant of the speech is
treated as a “second-class citizen,” or (4) the speech regulation is deemed “to be one of
general applicability such that any restriction on speech is merely incidental).
102. See id. at 360–62 (discussing low value speech and speech that is devoid of
constitutional protection).
103. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
104. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
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“true threats,”105 “advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent
lawless action,”106 obscenity,107 child pornography,108 etc.109 This
category also encompasses forms of speech that enjoy only a
limited measure of protection under the free speech guarantee.
For example, libelous speech is partially protected by the First
Amendment.110
Like libelous speech, commercial speech is
currently a second-class First Amendment citizen.111
Traditionally, commercial speech was beyond the scope of the
free speech guarantee.112 However, a paradigm shift occurred in
the Court’s treatment of commercial speech in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.113
In Virginia State Board, the Court held, for the first time, that the
free speech guarantee affords some degree of constitutional
protection to commercial speech.114 The Court explained that
commercial speech is “indispensable to the formation of intelligent
opinions as to how [a free market economy] ought to be regulated
or altered.”115 On this notion, the Court reasoned that it should
drape a thin veil of constitutional protection over commercial
speech due to the informative value of commercial speech to the

105. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
106. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012).
107. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
108. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765–66 (1982).
109. See generally United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012)
(discussing categories of speech that are not protected by the free speech guarantee).
110. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that a
public official can recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to her official
conduct if she proves that the statement was made with “actual malice”).
111. See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767,
830 (2001) (referring to commercial speech as “a second-class First Amendment
citizen”). Commercial speech is a second-class citizen in the sense that it is not viewed
as being as important as other forms of speech, such as political speech. See Robert C.
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 25–26
(2000) (summarizing the ways by which commercial speech is treated differently from
“public discourse” for constitutional purposes). Thus, commercial speech does not
receive the same degree of constitutional protection as non-commercial speech. See id.
at 26–28 (discussing how commercial speech and public discourse are treated
differently specifically within the context of compelled disclosures).
112. See Bus. Exec. Move for Viet. Peace v. F.C.C., 450 F.2d 642, 658 n.38 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (“Commercial advertising–indeed, any sort of commercial speech–is less
fully protected than other speech, because it generally does not communicate ideas and
thus is not directly related to the central purpose of the First Amendment.”).
113. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 765 (1976).
114. Id. at 762.
115. Id. at 765.
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general public.116 With respect to the three theoretical justifications
for free speech, commercial speech hangs its hat on the democratic
self-governance theory.117 In this vein, the primary constitutional
value of commercial speech is the circulation of accurate and useful
information.118
In this light, GM food labeling is presumptively within the
ambit of the free speech guarantee. However, if GM food labeling
falls into the commercial speech subcategory, it becomes a First
Amendment second-class citizen. The next section of this Note will
examine the definition of “commercial speech” and whether GM
food labeling aligns with this definition.
C. Defining Commercial Speech—Bolger and Common Sense
The definition of “commercial speech” is opaque.119 Among
the priorities of the Court, defining the precise contours of
commercial speech is not one of them.120 However, maintaining an
opaque conception of “commercial speech” might be a sound
policy—“the creativity of marketing professionals appears to be
truly inexhaustible, with new marketing techniques dreamed up
every day.”121 As a conceptual matter, commercial speech could be
similar to “hard-core pornography” in the sense that we know it
when we see it.122 In essence, common sense is an important aid in

116. See id. at 763 (going so far as to say that the value of commercial speech to a
consumer “may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most
urgent political debate”); Post, supra note 111, at 28.
117. See supra Part II.A. (discussing the theoretical justifications of the free
speech guarantee); Post, supra note 111, at 27 (describing commercial speech as the set
of communicative acts about commercial subjects that within a public communicative
sphere convey information of relevance to democratic decision making).
118. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
119. See Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2592 (2008).
120. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 663–65 (2003) (per curiam) (declining
to address a “novel First Amendment question[]” regarding “a blending of commercial
speech, noncommercial speech and debate on an issue of public importance”); see also
Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not
Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143, 1156 (2004) (clarifying that
the proper issue before the Court in Nike was the definition of commercial speech).
121. TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN AMERICA 31 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2013).
122. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I
shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description . . . . But I know it when I see it, and the
motion picture involved in this case is not that.”). See also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v.
S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518, 521 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“It is easier to discern what the Supreme
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identifying commercial speech.123
This is not to say that the Court has not given analytical
guidance at all. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,124 the
Court identified three factors that tend to identify commercial
speech.125 The three factors are (1) whether the speech is rendered
in an advertisement-like format, (2) whether a nexus exists
between a commercial product and the speech, and (3) whether a
nexus exists between the economic interests of the speaker and the
speech.126 The Court elucidated that all three factors need not be
present for speech to be commercial.127 In addition to these factors,
the commonsense distinction between speech that does no more
than propose a commercial transaction and other forms of speech
remains highly relevant.128
In light of the second and third Bolger factors, and sheer
common sense, GM food labeling is patent commercial speech.129
First, a strong nexus exists between a GM food label and the
foodstuff upon which it is placed. To begin, an article that a person
can use for food or drink, i.e., a foodstuff,130 that is offered for sale
is a commercial product—once the foodstuff is purchased, it enters
the flow of interstate commerce.131 In addition, as written or
printed material that appears on the immediate container of a
foodstuff,132 a GM food label broadcasts data about the foodstuff to

Court does not consider ‘commercial speech’ than to determine what speech falls
within that category.”).
123. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (“In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First
Amendment protection, we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable [sic] from
other forms. There are commonsense differences between speech that does no more
than propose a commercial transaction, and other varieties.” (citations omitted)).
124. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
125. See id. at 66–67.
126. Id. (considering three factors in determining whether “mailings fall within
the core notion of commercial speech–speech which does ‘no more than propose a
commercial transaction’”); see also Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 120, at 1147–48
(applying the Bolger factors to the facts of Nike).
127. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66–67 n.14.
128. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 771, n.24.
129. See Goodman, supra note 19, at 518 (“Product labels are commercial
speech.”).
130. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (2012) (defining “food”).
131. See United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 442 (D.D.C. 1968) (stating that
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is a valid exercise of the commerce power).
132. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(k) (2012) (defining “label”).
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which it relates.133 The broadcasted information can be either true
or false—either way, for purposes of the second Bolger factor, a
GM food label’s content is inextricably intertwined with the merits
(or vices) of the foodstuff.134 The nexus between a GM food label
and the foodstuff to which it relates is clear; a label conveys
substantive information about the product that bears the label.
Second, a strong nexus exists between a GM food label and
the economic interests of many food producers. For some food
producers, GM food labeling yields economic gain.135 Other food
producers have an economic motivation in protesting mandatory
GM food labeling, especially in light of the potential for reduced
sales.136 Thus, GM food labeling implicates the economic interests
of food producers in either a beneficial or negative way depending
on the circumstances. For purposes of the third Bolger factor, the
fact of the matter is that food producers’ economic interests are
implicated at all. The nexus between a GM food label and food
producers’ economic interests is unambiguous. In addition to the
two Bolger factors, common sense bolsters the conclusion that GM
food labeling is commercial speech—it is part and parcel of a
proposal to engage in a commercial transaction.137
The two Bolger factors and common sense support the
conclusion that GM food labels are commercial speech; this means
that GM food labeling enjoys only a limited measure of protection
under the free speech guarantee. Or in other words, the general
rule doesn’t apply—a government regulation of commercial speech
is not subject to strict scrutiny analysis.138 Next, this Note will
discuss the two alternative modes of means-end scrutiny that courts
use to analyze commercial speech regulations.
133. See, e.g., Fleminger, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 854 F.
Supp. 2d 192, 203 (D. Conn. 2012) (describing a green tea label that claimed that daily
consumption of green tea can reduce risk of certain forms of cancer).
134. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp.
2d 266, 269 (D.D.C. 2012) (discussing textual warnings that cigarette packages must
bear to inform consumers of the threat that cigarettes pose to health).
See, e.g., GMO: Your Right to Know, WHOLE FOODS MARKET,
135.
http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/gmo-your-right-know
[http://perma.cc/LEW39W6N] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) (labeling all food products sold in its stores that are
non-GMO).
136. See Dan D’Ambrosio, With Vermont in Front, GMO Fight Heats Up,
BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, June 9, 2013, 2013 WLNR 14164173.
137. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
138. Id. at 771–72 (“The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not
prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly
as well as freely.”).
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D. Central Hudson and Zauderer
Over the course of exercising judicial review for more than
two centuries,139 the judiciary has established several tests to
enforce constitutional limits on government action.140 Of these
several tests,141 means-end scrutiny is the most common and
important form of constitutional analysis—it is “a systematic
method for evaluating the sufficiency of the government’s
justification for its conduct.”142 In general, there are several
different species of means-end scrutiny.143 But specifically within
the commercial speech context, the default mode of means-ends
scrutiny is set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission of New York.144 Under Central
Hudson, a law constitutionally regulates commercial speech if (1)
the speech is not misleading, (2) the speech concerns lawful
activity, (3) the government has a “substantial” interest in
regulating the speech, (4) the law “directly advances” the
government’s substantial interest and (5) the law is “not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”145 Central
Hudson’s mode of means-ends scrutiny is described as
“intermediate scrutiny.”146
The first two prongs of Central Hudson establish “threshold
requirements” for the application of First Amendment
protections.147 With constitutional impunity, the government can
139. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret
that rule.”).
140. Russell W. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law,
21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 449, 449 (1988).
141. See id. at n.2 (listing, inter alia, “the clear and present danger test,” “the
actual malice test,” and “ad hoc multi-factor balancing tests”).
142. Id. at 449.
143. See id. at 457–58 (setting out the different “levels” of means-end scrutiny in
tabular format); Post, supra note 111, at 42 (stating that Central Hudson is the “major
doctrinal test” within the commercial speech doctrine).
144. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557 (1980).
145. Id. at 564–66; see Galloway, supra note 140, at 456 (“In commercial speech
cases, the Court requires a showing that government restrictions directly advance a
‘substantial’ government interest and are necessary.”).
146. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010)
(describing the Central Hudson analysis as intermediate scrutiny); JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16.31(b) (8th ed. 2010) (same); but
see Galloway, supra note 140, at 456 (describing the Central Hudson analysis as “subintermediate scrutiny”).
147. Post, supra note 111, at 34.
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regulate commercial speech that does not “inform the public about
lawful activity.”148 These threshold requirements contemplate the
constitutional value of commercial speech—the circulation of
accurate and useful information.149 In order to satisfy the three
remaining prongs,150 the law need only “directly advance a
substantial interest in a manner that is not too overinclusive; that is,
in a manner whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.”151
A law that regulates GM food labeling, which is commercial
speech, would presumably have to satisfy Central Hudson’s
intermediate scrutiny to pass muster under the free speech
guarantee.
However, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio,152 the Court established an alternative to
Central Hudson—a “less exacting”153 form of means-end scrutiny
that can apply to a law that compels commercial speech. In
Zauderer, plaintiff Philip Q. Zauderer was an attorney who
practiced criminal defense and personal injury litigation in
Columbus, Ohio.154 In an attempt to bolster his business, Mr.
Zauderer placed an advertisement in thirty-six Ohio newspapers in
the spring of 1982.155
The advertisement broadcasted Mr.
Zauderer’s willingness to represent—on a contingent-fee basis—
women who incurred personal injuries as a result of using the
Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device.156 However, the Supreme
Court of Ohio’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel took exception to
Mr. Zauderer’s advertisement.157
In the summer of 1982, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed
an attorney grievance complaint against Mr. Zauderer.158 The
complaint alleged, inter alia, that the Dalkon Shield advertisement,
which advertised legal representation on a contingent-fee basis,
failed to disclose, in contravention of a then-effective attorney

148. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64.
149. See id. at 563 (stating that the free speech guarantee’s “concern for
commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising.”).
150. See Post, supra note 111, at 42 (describing the remaining prongs as
“astonishingly abstract”).
151. Id. (citing Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
152. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
153. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 230
(2010).
154. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 629–31.
155. Id. at 630.
156. Id. at 630–31.
157. See id.
158. Id.
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discipline rule159 (“the disciplinary rule”), whether the percentage
of the contingent fee was computed before or after court costs and
expenses were deducted from the recovered damages, if any.160
Due to this omission, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel argued
that “the ad’s failure to inform clients that they would be liable for
costs (as opposed to legal fees) even if their claims were
unsuccessful rendered the advertisement ‘deceptive’ in violation of
[the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility].”161 Before both a
panel of the Board of Bar Commissioners and the Supreme Court
of Ohio, Mr. Zauderer unsuccessfully argued that the disciplinary
rule was unconstitutional under the free speech guarantee.162 Mr.
Zauderer appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review.163
At the outset, the Court recognized that the issue before it—
whether a state may seek to prevent potential deception of the
public by requiring attorneys to disclose in their advertising certain
information regarding fee arrangements—was different from prior
cases involving commercial speech.164 Rather than restraining
commercial speech, the disciplinary rule regulated commercial
speech “by requiring attorneys to disclose in their advertising
certain information regarding fee arrangements.”165 The Court
recognized that there are material differences between disclosure
requirements and outright prohibitions on commercial speech.166
Because the primary constitutional value of commercial speech is
the circulation of accurate and useful information, disclosure
requirements complement this value by adding data to the stream
of commercial information.167 Thus, the Court held that a
regulation that compels the disclosure of commercial speech does
not violate the free speech guarantee when the disclosure consists
of “purely factual and uncontroversial information” and the
disclosure is “reasonably related to the State’s interest in
preventing deception of consumers.”168 The Court concluded that
the disciplinary rule satisfied this standard, and upheld Mr.
159. For the full text of the disciplinary rule, see Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 632 n.4.
160. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 633–34.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 634–36.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 629 (“This case presents additional unresolved questions regarding the
regulation of commercial speech . . . .”).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 650.
167. Id. at 651.
168. Id.
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Zauderer’s public reprimand.169
In the successor case to Zauderer,170 the Court described the
standard set forth in Zauderer as “less exacting” means-end
scrutiny (“less exacting scrutiny”).171 On this point, it is paramount
to understand that less exacting scrutiny is more stringent than
mere rational basis review—the two forms of means-end scrutiny
should not be equivocated.172 Judge Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit elaborated on this
point in American Meat Institute v. U.S. Department of
Agriculture, a recent case involving compelled commercial speech:
When the Supreme Court applies rational basis review, it does
not attach a host of requirements of the kind prescribed
by Zauderer. Rational basis review is extremely deferential and
in this context would undoubtedly tolerate government
mandates of moral or policy-laden messages, of controversial
messages, of burdensome labels, of disclosures that are only
indirectly
related
to
the
Government’s
interests.
Zauderer tolerates none of that. Zauderer tightly limits
mandatory disclosures to a very narrow class that meets the
various Zauderer requirements.173

The Court’s characterization of Zauderer as less exacting
scrutiny when compared to Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny
is appropriate. Zauderer is less exacting in its analysis of the means
used by the government to further its interest, most notably in two
ways.174
First, Central Hudson requires a commercial speech regulation
to directly advance the government’s interest.175 Under Zauderer,
a commercial speech regulation need only be reasonably related to
the government’s interest.176 Second, by requiring a commercial
169. Id. at 652–55.
170. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010); see
Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing
Milavetz as the Court’s “later application of Zauderer”).
171. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 249.
172. Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 33–34 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
173. Id.; see also Igor Kirman, Standing Apart To Be Apart: The Precedential
Value of Supreme Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2084 (1995)
(“At the minimum, concurrences provide a commentary on the decisions that they
accompany and may aid lower courts in interpreting and applying such decisions.”).
174. See Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 33 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“As I read
it, the Supreme Court’s decision in Zauderer applied the Central Hudson ‘tailored in a
reasonable manner’ requirement to compelled commercial disclosures.”).
175. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980).
176. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
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speech regulation to be not more extensive than is necessary to
serve the government’s interest, Central Hudson conditions a
commercial speech regulation’s constitutionality on the absence of
a less restrictive alternative for achieving the government’s
interest.177 On the other hand, Zauderer’s less exacting scrutiny
does not analyze the availability of less restrictive alternatives.178
Given these differences, it is no surprise that “recently the Central
Hudson test has been applied with a severity that borders on strict
scrutiny.”179 Determining which standard of scrutiny applies to a
GM food labeling law is where the heart of the legal dispute
between GMA and the State of Vermont lies, with Vermont
arguing for less exacting scrutiny under Zauderer. To satisfy the
first two prongs of Zauderer, however, a GM food label must be
both purely factual and uncontroversial.
III. “PURELY FACTUAL” AND “UNCONTROVERSIAL”
The government can compel commercial speech by force of
law.180 However, for the government to invoke the benefit of less
exacting scrutiny, the compelled commercial speech must be purely
factual and uncontroversial.181
A. GM Food Labels as “Purely Factual” Compelled Commercial
Speech
Specifically, the purely factual requirement furthers the
primary constitutional value underlying the commercial speech
doctrine.182 By compelling purely factual commercial speech, the
government furthers the circulation of accurate and useful
information.183 In contrast, compelled commercial speech that is
177. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
178. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 n.14 (“Because the First Amendment interests
implicated by disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake
when speech is actually suppressed, we do not think it appropriate to strike down such
requirements merely because other possible means by which the State might achieve its
purposes can be hypothesized.”).
179. Post, supra note 111, at 42.
180. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976) (“The First Amendment, as we construe it today does not
prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly
as well as freely.”).
181. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117,
2015 WL 1931142, at *29 (D. Vt. Apr. 27, 2015).
182. The primary constitutional value of commercial speech is “the circulation of
accurate and useful information.” Post, supra note 111, at 28.
183. “Because the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial
speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech
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non-factual obstructs the commercial speech doctrine’s primary
constitutional value.184 By compelling non-factual commercial
speech, the government hampers the circulation of accurate and
useful information by disseminating government-prescribed
orthodoxies.185 As a doctrinal matter, compelled commercial
speech is non-factual if the government’s idiosyncratic value
judgments serve as the criterion186 against which the subject matter
of the speech’s content is evaluated.187
For instance, in Entertainment Software Association v.
Blagojevich, the Seventh Circuit held that compelled commercial
speech that addressed the suitability of video games for minors was
non-factual.188 Specifically, the State of Illinois required video
game retailers to append a four-inch square label that bore the
numbers “18” to the packaging of “sexually explicit” video
games.189 The “18” sticker (the compelled commercial speech)
communicated to consumers that a video game (the subject matter
of the speech’s content) that bore the “18” sticker was not
appropriate for minors (the speech’s content) because it was
“sexually explicit” (the criterion—an idiosyncratic value judgment).
In so holding, the Blagojevich court affirmed the lower court’s
ruling that whether a particular video game is “sexually explicit” is
inherently “opinion-based.”190
In Blagojevich, the idiosyncratic value judgments of the State
of Illinois served as the criterion against which video games were
provides . . . [Zauderer’s] constitutionally protected interest in not providing any
particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.” Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
184. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“Our decision reaches only required disclosure of factual commercial information.
Requiring actors in the marketplace to espouse particular opinions would likely raise
issues not presented here.”).
185. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (distinguishing government attempts to
prescribe what shall be orthodox in matters of opinion and attempts to prescribe what
shall be orthodox in commercial advertising).
186. This Note employs the term “criterion” as meaning “a standard on which a
decision or judgment may be based” or “a standard of judgment.” WEBSTER’S NEW
INT’L DICTIONARY 538 (3d. ed. 2002).
187. See generally Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir.
2006) aff’g 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v.
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009); aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Entm’t
Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
188. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 651–53.
189. The term “sexually explicit” was defined by statute. Id. at 643–44.
Entm’t Software Ass’n, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1081 (“Unlike labeling
190.
requirements that have been upheld under the commercial speech test, the question
whether a game is violent or sexually-explicit is a subjective evaluation left to the
discretion of the retailer.”).
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assessed. Conceptions of “sexually explicit” are as manifold as
conceptions of “beauty,” “justice” or “piety.” Thus, “sexually
explicit” lacks a fixed factual meaning because any meaning
attributable to the term is relative to the opinion of the person
defining it.191 By implication, communicating that a particular
video game is inappropriate for minors on the ground that it is
“sexually explicit” amounts to nothing more than an expression of
opinion.192 Whether or not Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas is
“sexually explicit” is entirely in the eye of the player.193
The Seventh Circuit’s holding is supported on theoretical
grounds as well; the reasoning in Blagojevich complements the
marketplace of ideas justification for the free speech guarantee.194
In the words of Justice Holmes, the theory behind the Constitution
is that “the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”195 Moreover, when
the government compels non-factual commercial speech on a given
topic, the government subordinates the commercial speaker’s
opinion on the same topic.196 By doing so, the government drives
highly relevant opinions out of the marketplace of ideas.197
Thereby, the government insulates the accuracy of the non-factual
commercial speech from adversarial scrutiny, and covers the nonfactual speech with a thin veil of presumptive utility. This
undercuts the primary constitutional value of the commercial
speech doctrine, since non-factual commercial speech fails to
materially advance the circulation of accurate and useful
191. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 31, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-00117-cr (D.Vt. Sept. 11,
2014), ECF No.33-1 (arguing that GM labeling is non-factual commercial speech).
192. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “opinion”
as “[a] person’s thought, belief or inference . . . as opposed to personal knowledge of
the fact themselves.”).
193. To justify the videogame labeling law, the State of Illinois introduced
screenshots from three videogames: (1) Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas, (2) Leisure
Suit Larry: Magna Cum Laude, and (3) The Guy Game: Uncut and Uncensored.
Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 644.
194. See supra Part II.A. Individuals objectively assess competing opinions to
determine which one, if any, conveys the “truth” of the matter. JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16.6 (d) (8th ed. 2010) (discussing
Holmes’ “marketplace of ideas”).
195. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
196. See Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 652.
197. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York,
447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980) (“[C]ommercial speakers have extensive knowledge of
both the market and their products. Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the
accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity.”).
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information.
In summation, the “18” sticker in Blagojevich was non-factual
because the idiosyncratic value judgments of the State of Illinois
served as the criterion against which the subject matter of the
speech’s content was evaluated.198
Compelling non-factual
commercial speech frustrates the inner-workings of the
marketplace of ideas, which thereby obstructs the advancement of
the commercial speech doctrine’s primary value. As a result,
Illinois could not invoke the benefit of Zauderer’s less exacting
scrutiny; instead, it faced strict scrutiny and the court held that the
law was unconstitutional.199
In stark contrast to the “18” sticker, a GM food label is purely
factual compelled commercial speech.200 The GM food label (the
compelled commercial speech) communicates to consumers that
the label-bearing foodstuff (the subject matter of the speech’s
content) is genetically modified (the speech’s content) because the
product was produced by means of either in vitro nucleic acid
techniques or cell fusion or hybridization techniques that overcome
natural physiological, reproductive, or recombination barriers (the
criterion).
With respect to Vermont’s labeling law, the
idiosyncratic value judgments of the State of Vermont do not serve
as the criterion against which a foodstuff is assessed. Instead, an
external body of verifiable knowledge serves as the applicable
criterion, which is set forth in section 3042(4) of the labeling law.201
Vermont’s statutory criterion is congruent with the scientific
understanding of which modes of food production constitute
methods of genetic modification.202
Since Vermont’s statutory criterion is congruent to the

198. See Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 652 (stating that the sticker communicates a
subjective and highly controversial message).
199. Id. at 652–53.
200. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at
10–11, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-00117-cr (D.Vt. Aug. 8, 2014).
201. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3042(4)(A)–(B) (defining “genetic engineering”).
See Jeanne Frazier Price, Wagging, Not Barking: Statutory Definitions, 60 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 999, 1019 (2013) (“By defining terms, statutes create categories into which
behaviors, entities, individuals, and actions—both present and future—are somehow
made to fit.”).
202. James Maryanski, Testimony before the H. Subcomm. on Basic Scientific
Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Oct. 19, 1999),
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm115032.htm
[http://perma.cc/B37HCKMM] (last updated Aug. 06, 2009) (“the United States uses the term genetic
modification to refer to all forms of breeding, both modern, i.e., genetic engineering,
and conventional”).
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scientific consensus on the matter,203 it has a fixed factual meaning.
In other words, Vermont’s criterion is different from Illinois’s
definition of “sexually explicit” because it was not shaped by the
person defining it. Instead, Vermont’s criterion is a transplanted
conception that was shaped by third parties who specialize in the
areas of concern, namely, genetics and biotechnology.204
Therefore, within the context of Vermont’s labeling law, GM food
labeling is purely factual compelled commercial speech.205
By way of counterargument, it is immaterial that Vermont’s
criterion encompasses different methods of genetic modification.206
This feature does not mean that Vermont’s criterion, as a whole, is
devoid of a fixed factual meaning.207 If anything, Vermont’s
criterion of genetic modification clarifies the term by providing an
express analytical framework that breaks down the technical,
scientific concepts that the term generally includes in common
parlance.208 Vermont’s criterion breaks down a “lexical chunk”
into small, digestible concepts, which allows food producers and
consumers alike to understand and use it for objective assessment
of food products.209
In summation, Vermont’s criterion accords with the scientific
conception of genetic modification—it has fixed, empirical referent
and is not shaped by subjective value judgments. In addition,
Vermont’s criterion allows for an objective evaluation of food
products that yields black and white answers: a food product is
either genetically modified or not. GM food labeling communicates
non-opinion based information about food products intended for
human consumption. In stark contrast to Illinois’ “18” sticker in
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “fact” as
“[s]omething that actually exists; an aspect of reality”).
206. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117, 2015 WL 1931142, at *31
n.33 (D. Vt. Apr. 27, 2015) (Plaintiffs point to no authority for the proposition that
speech is misleading when it fails to reflect a party’s preferred definition of a
statutorily-defined term.).
207. See id. (denying plaintiff’s argument that the labeling law is factually
misleading because there are multiple, plausible definitions of “GE”); see also
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 31, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-00117-cr
(D.Vt. Sept. 11, 2014), ECF No.33-1 (arguing that Vermont’s GE definition does not
have a fixed meaning).
208. See Price, supra note 201, at 1024 (explaining that technical terms are
understood best by means of a conceptual model).
209. See id. (discussing that “lexical chunks,” i.e., nuanced technical terms, are
more difficult to understand than individual words).
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Blagojevich, GM food labeling is “purely factual” compelled
commercial speech.
B. GM Food Labels as Controversial Compelled Commercial
Speech
The purely factual requirement is not the only hurdle that the
government must surmount to invoke the benefit of Zauderer’s less
exacting scrutiny. Compelled commercial speech must also be
uncontroversial (“the uncontroversial requirement”).210 At the
outset it is important to highlight that, as a matter of legal doctrine,
the precise contours of the uncontroversial requirement are far
from clear.211 Judge Kavanaugh made this point clear in American
Meat Institute: “To be sure, determining whether a disclosure is
‘uncontroversial’ may be difficult in some compelled commercial
speech cases, in part because it is unclear how we should assess and
what we should examine to determine whether a mandatory
disclosure is controversial.”212 The first section of this part will
analyze and critique the perspectives of GMA and Vermont
concerning what a court should examine to determine if the
uncontroversial requirement is satisfied.213 The second section of
this part will offer a method to assess compelled commercial speech
for impermissible controversy.
1.

Substance: What a Court Should Examine

First, Vermont’s perspective is quite narrow—the court should
focus on whether empirical evidence supports the existence of the
disclosed fact.214 From this outlook, compelled commercial speech
is controversial if it does not convey empirically accurate
210. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
211. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
212. Id. (emphasis added).
213. In the end, the district court sustained Vermont’s conception of the
uncontroversial requirement. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117, 2015
WL 1931142, at *32 (“Because Act 120’s GE disclosure requirement mandates the
disclosure of only factual information—whether a food product contains GE
ingredients—in conjunction with a purely commercial transaction, it does not require
the disclosure of ‘controversial’ information.”).
214. See id. (concluding that the labeling law was uncontroversial because it
mandates the disclosure of factual information); Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in
Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 12, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v.
Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117 (D. Vt. Aug. 8, 2014), ECF No. 24 [hereinafter Defendants’
Memorandum of Law](arguing that GM food labeling is uncontroversial because “a
disclosure that food was produced with genetic engineering—which is all Act 120
requires—is a true and objective fact.”).
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information about some discrete aspect of the world.215 “For
example, if a loaf of bread contains wheat flour, that fact is
demonstrably provable and not open to value disagreements. It
describes an uncontroverted state of being.”216 In essence, from
Vermont’s perspective, compelled commercial speech that conveys
a fact that has definitive, rather than mixed, empirical support
amounts to uncontroversial commercial speech.217
On the other hand, GMA’s perspective is quite broad—the
court should focus on whether the disclosed fact advances a
controversial ideology as opposed to a generally accepted norm.218
From GMA’s outlook, compelled commercial speech advances a
controversial ideology when the disclosed fact is “germane” to a
norm, and the norm to which the disclosed fact is germane is in
some way contested.219 If the disclosed fact is germane to a
contested norm, the compelled commercial speech is impermissibly
controversial.220 Professor Goodman analyzes this perspective
from the government’s vantage point. Specifically, when the
government compels commercial speech, it becomes “a participant
in information markets, using its regulatory power or spending
power to get private parties to speak.”221 If the government
implicitly takes a side about whether the disclosed fact is germane
to the transaction at hand, the compelled commercial speech is
215. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 214, at 12.
216.
Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech
Conundrum, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 237 (2011) (emphasis added).
217. See id. at 238 (“For factual information to be ‘controverted,’ it must have
mixed empirical support for its existence as an actual state of being.”).
218. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 14, Grocery Mfrs.
Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117 (D. Vt. June 12, 2014), ECF No. 1; Plaintiffs’
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 31, Grocery Man. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-00117-cr (D. Vt. Sept. 11,
2014), ECF No. 33-1 (“[The labeling law] is intended to fuel controversy.”); see also
Goodman, supra note 19, at 550 (asserting that the unconstitutional requirement
concerns “disclosures that, even if purely factual, are designed to advance a
controversial ideology as opposed to a generally accepted norm”).
219. See Goodman, supra note 19, at 553–54 (“The work that ‘noncontroversial’
does in the advancement of consumer-autonomy interests is to impose a germaneness
requirement on the state. . . . Limiting Zauderer review to instances in which the
mandated disclosure is of uncontroversial relevance to consumer purchases would
serve the same purpose.”).
220. See Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion
for a Preliminary Injunction at 33, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117 (D.
Vt. Sept. 11, 2014), ECF No. 33 (“As one witness put it, mandatory labeling is merely a
‘shibboleth, for a far larger issue’ about modern agriculture.”); Goodman, supra note
19, at 553 (construing Zauderer’s “noncontroversial” language to impose a
“germaneness” requirement on the state).
221. Goodman, supra note 19, at 553.
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impermissibly controversial.222
For example, a “conflict free” insignia on the packaging of a
product that typically incorporates “conflict minerals” conveys a
fact. 223 The fact is that the specific, insignia-bearing product is
devoid of minerals that are typically extracted from warlordcontrolled mining sites in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.224
Moreover, the important point is that the conflict free insignia is
also highly germane to a normative value. The normative value to
which the conflict free insignia is germane is that it is impermissible
for American consumers to condone the war and humanitarian
catastrophes that have occurred in the Congo through the
purchasing power of the dollar.225 In this example, the conflict free
insignia performs two functions—it broadcasts an empirically
uncontroverted fact, and, because it is germane to a normative
value that is controversial, it furthers a controversial ideology as
opposed to a generally accepted norm.226
In sum, GMA’s
perspective requires a court to examine whether the compelled
commercial speech is germane to a controversial normative value,
i.e., whether the disclosed fact advances a controversial ideology.227
Between the perspectives of Vermont and GMA concerning
what substantive information a court should examine to determine
if the uncontroversial requirement is satisfied, GMA’s outlook
should prevail for two reasons. First, Vermont’s reading of
Zauderer is interpretatively unsound.
Second, Vermont’s
construction is anathema to the primary constitutional value of
commercial speech.
At the same time, GMA’s perspective
embraces an evenhanded reading of Zauderer, and it complements
the primary constitutional value of commercial speech.
a.

Interpretative Issues
It is important to highlight the interpretive issues surrounding

222. Id. at 553–54.
223. This example derives from the facts of Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d
359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (overruled on other grounds by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
224. Id. at 362–63 (explaining that armed groups finance the war in the Congo by
exploiting the country’s trade in gold, tantalum, tin, and tungsten, which are
colloquially referred to as “conflict minerals”).
225. See id. at 371 (holding that the SEC’s disclosure requirement violated the
First Amendment because it “compell[ed] an issuer to confess blood on its hands”).
226. See id. at 373.
227. See Goodman, supra note 19, at 549 (“While value may be inextricable from
fact, that does not mean that the kind and strength of value is irrelevant to First
Amendment considerations.”).
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Vermont’s perspective on what courts should examine in
determining if the uncontroversial requirement is satisfied. In
Zauderer, the Court’s holding focused in part on the content of the
commercial speech; specifically, it sustained the constitutionality of
the disciplinary rule because the rule provided mere “purely factual
and uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . .
services will be available.”228 Vermont’s reading of the latterquoted language is interpretatively unsound.
Specifically, Vermont’s reading of Zauderer is unsound in light
of two important principles of legal interpretation. First, when two
words or phrases are separated by the word “and” in a specific
sentence, each of the two words or phrases constitutes a discrete
requirement or element.229 Second, an interpretation that would
render a word or phrase redundant or meaningless should be
rejected.230 At the confluence of these two principles lies the sound
conclusion that Vermont’s perspective is interpretatively unsound.
Vermont’s reading of Zauderer equivocates the words
“uncontroversial” and “factual.”231 By doing so, it deprives the
word “uncontroversial” of actual meaning; in other words, the
narrow reading of Zauderer renders particular language of the
Court superfluous and void.232 Since Vermont’s perspective would,
in essence, write the word “uncontroversial” out of the Court’s
opinion in Zauderer, it should be rejected. In addition, Vermont’s
reading of Zauderer fails to honor the fact that the Court separated
“purely factual” and “uncontroversial” with the word “and.” From
the phraseology used in Zauderer, it is fair to infer that the Court
intended to establish two discrete and substantively different
requirements—namely, that compelled commercial speech must be
both “purely factual” and “uncontroversial” to receive the benefit

228. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(emphasis added).
229. Cf. 1A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 53, § 21:14.
230. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518, 529 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(explaining that interpreting “purely factual and uncontroversial” as “purely factual
and accurate” leads to a redundancy). Cf. 2A NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:6 (7th ed. 2014) (“It is an elementary
rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and
sentence of a statute.”) (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)).
231. See Goodman, supra note 19, at 552 (“In other words, ‘uncontroversial’ is
synonymous with ‘factual.’” (emphasis added)). See also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d
at 529 n.28 (“Is there such a thing as a ‘purely factual’ proposition that is not
‘accurate’?”).
232. Cf. 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 230, § 46:6 (stating that courts
interpret laws so that no part of the law is either inoperative, superfluous or void).
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of less exacting scrutiny.
Vermont’s perspective on what substantive information courts
should examine in determining if the uncontroversial requirement
is satisfied runs contrary to the Court’s intent, which can be
inferred from the phraseology of Zauderer. As a result, Vermont’s
outlook results in unnecessary duplicity. Examining whether the
disclosed fact conveys uncontroverted information about some
discrete aspect of the external world is tantamount to investigating
whether compelled commercial speech is accurate and true, or in
other words, purely factual. Vermont’s perspective is unsound.
b.

Constructive Issues

Most significantly, it is paramount to stress the fact that
Vermont’s perspective on what substantive information courts
should examine in determining if the uncontroversial requirement
is satisfied is injurious to the primary constitutional value of
commercial speech. In holding that the free speech guarantee
affords some degree of constitutional protection to commercial
speech, the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy reasoned
that the primary constitutional value of commercial speech is the
circulation of accurate and useful information.233
Identifying the circulation of accurate and useful information
as the primary constitutional value of commercial speech hinges on
a key presupposition—democracy subordinates government to
public opinion.234 Specifically, the proper functioning of American
democracy depends on the citizenry’s access to commercial
information.235
The grant of constitutional protection to
commercial speech allows commercial information to freely enter
the communicative sphere.236 Enabling individuals to tap into a
vast depository of commercial information cognitively empowers
the citizenry;237 armed with such information, individuals can voice
233. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650–51; Post, supra note 111, at 28 (“For the
state to mandate disclosures designed more fully and completely to convey information
is thus to advance, rather than to contradict, pertinent constitutional values.”).
234. POST, supra note 89, at 35.
235. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 (“Therefore, even if the First
Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not
serve that goal.”) (footnote omitted) (citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)).
236. See Post, supra note 111, at 25.
237. See Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 630
(1982).
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competent opinions with respect to the “significant issues of the
day.”238 It is beyond doubt that an “informed public opinion will
more intelligently and effectively supervise the government.”239
Therefore, without competent commercial speech, the citizenry
would lose its epistemic depth, and when the citizenry could no
longer touch the bottom, government would go deaf, blind, and
dumb.240
Vermont’s perspective eviscerates the presupposition upon
which the primary constitutional value of commercial speech
hinges.241 By only examining the empirical accuracy of the
commercial speech in determining if the uncontroversial
requirement is satisfied, the government could infuse purely factual
information that is germane to a highly contested norm into the
communicative sphere.242 In other words, under Vermont’s theory,
the government would be at complete liberty to inject the
particular ideological stance that it endorses into a protracted and
substantial controversy of public concern.243
Rather than cognitively empowering the citizenry, purely
factual compelled commercial speech that is germane to a
contested norm would shackle the minds of citizens to the
government’s ideological standpoint.244 In such a case, public
opinion and government policy would be indistinguishable. Rather
than public opinion shaping government action through the
democratic process, government policy could unilaterally dictate
public opinion and private action with respect to matters of
unsettled controversy.245 The Court recognized the problems

238. Bates v. St. Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977). See POST, supra note 89,
at 40–41 (asserting that commercial speech conveys factual knowledge that “cognitively
empowers public opinion”).
239. POST, supra note 89, at 35.
240. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 122 (1990).
241. Identifying the circulation of accurate and useful information as the primary
constitutional value of the commercial speech doctrine hinges on the premise that
democracy subordinates government to public opinion. POST, supra note 89, at 43.
242. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518, 529 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(“[A]s Mark Twain wrote, ‘Often, the surest way to convey misinformation is to tell the
strict truth.’”).
243. See id. at 530 n.29.
244. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(explaining that the government cannot “prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein” (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943)).
245. See id. at 651 (emphasizing how government orthodoxy is constitutionally
impermissible).
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surrounding such a situation by examining history:
Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the
lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out
Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as
a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a
means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our
present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive
elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating
dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the
unanimity of the graveyard.246

Vermont does violence to the primary constitutional value of
commercial speech by endorsing a narrow perspective on what
substantive information courts should examine in determining if
the uncontroversial requirement is satisfied. By undermining
commercial speech’s primary constitutional value, Vermont’s
outlook places the proper functioning of American democracy
much at hazard and maims the autonomy interests of private
individuals.
By adopting GMA’s perspective on what substantive
information courts should examine in determining if the
uncontroversial requirement is satisfied, a safety valve is
incorporated into Zauderer’s less exacting scrutiny. GMA’s
outlook allows for the free flow of accurate and useful commercial
information. At the same time, it also mitigates the potential for
purely factual compelled commercial speech to be used as a prod
by the government. It dampens the possibility that the government
can use compelled commercial speech to unduly influence the
thoughts and conduct of citizens with respect to contested social
issues. Between the respective outlooks proposed by Vermont and
GMA, GMA’s perspective on what courts should examine in
determining if the uncontroversial requirement is satisfied must
prevail.
2.

Procedure: How a Court Should Assess Compelled
Commercial Speech

In the section prior, this Note assessed the two prevailing
perspectives regarding what substantive information courts should
examine in determining if compelled commercial speech is
impermissibly controversial. The section prior argued that GMA’s
perspective should prevail.
In sum and substance, GMA’s
246.

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
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perspective focuses on whether the compelled commercial speech,
even if purely factual, advances a controversial ideology.247 From
this outlook, compelled commercial speech advances a
controversial ideology when the disclosed fact is germane to a
contested norm.248 A purely factual compelled disclosure that
advances a generally accepted norm is not constitutionally
impermissible under the applicable uncontroversial requirement.249
This is the case because by doing so, the government is not
advancing its own opinion with respect to a dispute; rather, it is
legitimizing the bona fide conventions of society at large.250 In this
section, this Note will offer an analytical mechanism to assess the
substantive information that was identified in the section prior.
To begin, in order to determine whether a disclosed fact is
germane to a contested normative value it is necessary to: (1)
identify the disclosed fact, (2) identify the norm to which the
disclosed fact is germane,251 (3) determine whether the norm is
contested,252 and (4) weigh the informative force of the disclosed
fact against the normative force of the contested value to which it is
relevant.253 If the normative force of the compelled commercial
speech outweighs its informative force, the compelled commercial
speech is impermissibly controversial, and not subject to
Zauderer’s less exacting scrutiny.254
First, the Vermont labeling law255 mandates food producers to
disclose which of their food products were produced by means of
genetic modification.256 The information a GM food label conveys

247. See Goodman, supra note 19, at 550 (“We should be skeptical of disclosures
that, even if purely factual, are designed to advance a controversial ideology as
opposed to a generally accepted norm.”).
248. See Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion
for a Preliminary Injunction at 31, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-117-cr
(D. Vt. Sept. 11, 2014), ECF No. 33.
249. See id.; Goodman, supra note 19, at 550.
250. See Nation, supra note 48, at 329.
251. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 19, at 553 (giving an example between a
sugar level disclosure and the health norm relevant to the disclosure).
252. See Goodman, supra note 19, at 554 (“A usable definition of ‘controversial’
would have to be worked out, as courts have worked out other standards based on
assessments of social consensus.”).
253. “What is important is both the nature of the value and the balance of
contestable value with uncontestable fact.” Goodman, supra note 19, at 549.
254.
See Goodman, supra note 19, at 553—54 (“Somewhere along this
continuum, the normative agenda overwhelms the informative agenda and more
searching scrutiny would be warranted.”).
255. See supra Part I.B.
256. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3043(b) (2014) (effective July 1, 2016).
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is clear: based on an objective evaluation of the processes used to
produce the label-bearing product, the labeled product was
produced by means of genetic modification. A GM food label
broadcasts factual information because idiosyncratic value
judgments do not form the criterion against which the food product
is assessed for purposes of the labeling law.257
The second step is to identify the norm to which the disclosed
fact is germane. Building on Professor Goodman’s “germaneness
requirement,” this Note proposes that the concept of relevance, as
set forth in Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, can be used
to assess whether compelled commercial speech is germane to a
normative value.258 In this vein, a disclosed fact is relevant to a
normative value if the fact’s presence makes it more or less
probable that subjective value judgments could influence the
consumer’s decision to purchase or not to purchase the good to
which the disclosed fact relates.259
For example, in CTIA–The Wireless Association v. City &
County of San Francisco, the defendant passed an ordinance, which
required cell phone resellers to disclose to consumers that cell
phones emit radiofrequency energy that is absorbed by the head
and body.260 Under this Note’s proposal, the norm to which the
radiofrequency disclosure is relevant is that it is good to reduce
your exposure to radiofrequency energy for health reasons.
GM food labeling is substantially similar to the disclosure in
CTIA–The Wireless Association.
By mandating the food
manufacturer or retailer to append a GM food label in “clear and
conspicuous” words to a foodstuff’s container,261 the norm to which
the GM food label is relevant is that it is allegedly good to reduce
your consumption of GM foods out of, inter alia, health and
environmental concerns.262 The choice to highlight the fact that the
food is genetically modified reflects a normative value, namely,
257. See Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006)
(“Even if one assumes that the State’s definition of ‘sexually explicit’ is precise, it is the
State’s definition—the video game manufacturer or retailer may have an entirely
different definition of this term.”).
258. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (establishing the test for relevant evidence).
See id.; see generally GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE,
259.
WEISSENBERGER’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 401.3, at 99 (6th ed. 2009) (“The offered
evidence need only make the fact sought to be proven more probable or less probable
in order to satisfy Rule 401.”).
260. CTIA–Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cty.of San Francisco, 827 F.Supp.2d 1054
(N.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d 494 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2012).
261. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3043(b) (2014) (effective July 1, 2016).
262. See id. § 3041(1)–(2).
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GM foods are inherently different for the wrong reasons.263
The third step is to ascertain the nature of the relevant norms,
or in other words, a court must determine whether the relevant
norms are contested, uncontested, or somewhere in the middle. In
so doing, it is important to appreciate the kind and strength of the
norm at issue.264 Professor Goodman instructs that, in similar
fashion to other areas of constitutional law, a court should look at
the state of society at the time the issue arose.265 With respect to
GM food labeling, the specific norm—the limitation of GM food
consumption for health and environmental reasons—is contested as
a matter of science and as a general matter of societal concern.266
“One need not witness a ‘March Against Monsanto’ to grasp the
point; the controversy is . . . on the face of Act 120.”267
The last step is to weigh the informative force of the disclosed
fact against the countervailing normative force.268 Specifically, the
court should determine whether the normative force of the
compelled disclosure overwhelms its informative force.269 In an
effort to make this abstract assessment more concrete, this Note
proposes that the concept of balancing probative value against
unfair prejudice, as set forth in Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, can be used to assess whether the informative force of
compelled commercial speech is stronger than the countervailing
normative force.270
In assessing the informative force of compelled commercial

263. See Goodman, supra note 19, at 546 (“The choice to include sugar on a
nutritional label is arguably free of normative content. But the choice to highlight sugar
on a front-of-pack label reflects a norm that sugar is special among ingredients.”).
264. See Goodman, supra note 19, at 549.
265. See Goodman, supra note 19, at 554 n.252 (discussing how the Court has
considered “social consensus” with respect to defining “obscenity” and “cruel and
unusual punishment” for constitutional purposes).
266. See Glass-O’Shea, supra note 21, at 10 (“Remarkably, even with this high
level of [GE food] consumption, there have been no cases of demonstrated harm to
humans from eating GM foods.”); Glass-O’Shea, supra note 21, at 12; James Shanahan
et al., Attitudes About Agricultural Biotechnology & Genetically Modified Organisms,
65 PUB. OPINION Q., no. 2, 267, 272 (2001).
267. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 31, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-117-cr (D. Vt.
Sept. 11, 2014), ECF No. 33.
268. See Goodman, supra note 19, at 549 (“What is important is both the nature
of the value and the balance of contestable value with uncontestable fact.”).
269. See Goodman, supra note 19, at 554 (“Somewhere along this continuum, the
normative agenda overwhelms the informative agenda and more searching scrutiny
would be warranted.”).
270. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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speech, a court could assess the “facial vagueness”271 of the
commercial speech at issue and consumers’ need for the particular
compelled commercial speech.272 In assessing the normative force
of compelled commercial speech, a court can assess, in light of the
identified normative value(s), the effect of the commercial speech
on the probable behavior of consumers.273 This assessment
implicates whether the compelled commercial speech at issue
undermines the constitutional value of commercial speech—the
circulation of accurate and useful information.274 As Professor
Goodman explains, striking the right balance between the two
forces is important—the normative force of compelled commercial
speech could subsume its capacity to convey factual data by
unfairly prejudicing or misleading consumers in some way.275
Specifically, the normative force of a GM food label outweighs
its informative force.
With respect to a GM food label’s
informative force, the content of a GM food label is readily
understandable.276
It conveys “factually straightforward”277
information—the particular foodstuff to which the GM food label
relates was produced by means of genetic modification.
Notwithstanding a GM food label’s lack of facial vagueness,
consumers’ need for this information is not dire for three reasons.
First, the private sector offers food producers, such as Mr.
Rickert,278 who want to voluntarily certify and market their
products as non-GM the means to do so.279 In addition, some
271. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in
Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law
of Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 884 (1988) (explaining how a judge can ascertain
the probative value of logically relevant evidence).
272. Cf. Andrews v. State, 429 S.W.3d 849, 865 (Tex. App. 2014), reh’g overruled
(May 6, 2014), petition for discretionary review refused (Aug. 20, 2014) (considering
the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along with the
proponent’s need for that evidence).
273. Cf. id.; Imwinkelried, supra note 271, at 889–90 (stating that the focus is on
the cognitive behavior of the jury during trial).
274. Goodman, supra note 19, at 553 (“Somewhere along this continuum, the
normative agenda overwhelms the informative agenda and more searching scrutiny
would be warranted.”).
275. Goodman, supra note 19, at 553; see also Goodman, supra note 19, at 552.
276. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in judgment) (considering that the content of a country-oforigin label was readily understandable).
277. Id.
278. See supra p. 1 and note 1.
279.
About,
Who
We
Are,
NON-GMO
PROJECT,
http://www.nongmoproject.org/about/who-we-are/
[http://perma.cc/2XMK-EULQ]
(last visited Oct. 1, 2015) (offering private non-GMO certification for food producers).
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members of the private sector voluntarily label non-GM
foodstuffs.280 Last, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration “is not
aware of any information showing that foods derived by these new
methods differ from other foods in any meaningful or uniform way,
or that, as a class, foods developed by the new techniques present
any different or greater safety concern than foods developed by
traditional plant breeding.”281
Placing significance on the
distinction between GM and non-GM foodstuffs is inapposite in
light of the Federal Food and Drug Administration’s 1992
Statement of Policy, and because it is far from the case that
consumers have absolutely no idea as to which products derive
from genetic modification.
With respect to a GM food label’s normative force, the
presence of a GM food label increases the possibility of consumers
making consumption choices on improper bases. The bases upon
which a consumer can make a consumption choice with respect to a
foodstuff that bears a GM food label are found in the labeling law
itself.282 Specifically, a consumer could abstain from purchasing a
GM foodstuff that is labeled as such for health or environmental
reasons.283 The bases are improper for at least three reasons.
First, whether or not GM foodstuffs are injurious to human
health has yet to be answered with definitive scientific evidence.284
Second, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s 1992 Statement
of Policy explicitly states that GM foodstuffs pose no more risk to
human health than non-GM foodstuffs.285 Last, the Food and Drug
Administration specifically stated in the 1992 Statement of Policy
that its laissez-faire approach to GM foodstuffs “does not
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human
environment.”286 In this light, when faced with a GM food label,
280.
See GMO: Your Right to Know, WHOLE FOODS MARKET,
http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/gmo-your-right-know
[http://perma.cc/LEW39W6N] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) (labeling all food products sold in its stores that are
non-GM).
281. Statement of Policy - Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg.
22984,
22991
(May
29,
1992)
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInform
ation/Biotechnology/ucm096095.htm#summary [http://perma.cc/EC2L-LJFC].
282. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3041(1)–(4).
283. See id. § 3041(1)–(2).
284. See Glass-O’Shea, supra note 21, at 10 (“Remarkably, even with this high
level of [GM food] consumption, there have been no cases of demonstrated harm to
humans from eating GM foods.”).
285. Statement of Policy - Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg.
at 22991 (May 29, 1992).
286. Id. at 23,005; see also Glass-O’Shea, supra note 21, at 12.
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making a consumption decision on the basis of either health or
environmental concern is misplaced.
Hence, the normative force of a GM food label outweighs its
informative force—GM food labeling is not uncontroversial.
Under Zauderer, this is constitutionally impermissible. Given the
current circumstances, a government-mandated GM food label, i.e.,
compelled commercial speech, reflects the side in the GM food
debate to which the government adheres.
By dragooning
consumers into making consumption choices that alights with its
policy on GM foodstuffs, the government unilaterally dictates
public opinion and private action with respect to a scientific and
societal controversy. In essence, GM food labeling advances a
controversial ideological standpoint. Therefore, GM food labeling,
although purely factual, is controversial compelled commercial
speech. Zauderer’s less exacting scrutiny does not apply.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Vermont cannot claim the benefit of Zauderer’s
less exacting scrutiny. Although GM food labeling is purely factual
commercial speech, it is not uncontroversial. GM food labeling is
controversial because it advances the government’s perspective
with respect to a controversial ideology. By doing so, Vermont
places the proper functioning of democracy at hazard and maims
the autonomy interests of private individuals. In essence, allowing
Vermont to invoke the benefit of Zauderer’s rational-relationship
rule with respect to controversial speech would eviscerate the
constitutional value of commercial speech.
This conclusion directly impacts Massachusetts and House Bill
369.
If House Bill 369 becomes law in Massachusetts,
Massachusetts should expect to defend the constitutionality of
House Bill 369 under a more exacting level of judicial scrutiny.
Whether Massachusetts can successfully do so is called into doubt
by existing precedent.287 In this vein, House Bill 369 should not
pass, since it would probably succumb to the pressure of the
constitutional crucible.
At the same time, Massachusetts could attempt to claim the
benefit of Zauderer’s less exacting scrutiny by showing that statemandated labeling of genetically modified food is not controversial.
In light of this Note’s proposed framework, Massachusetts could
287. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding
that Vermont could not compel manufacturers of dairy products to disclose whether
their products contain rGBH, a type of GE hormone).
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satisfy this requirement by showing that GM foods present
different or greater safety concerns than non-GM foods; thus, the
informative value of state-mandated GM food labels would
outweigh any normative force.
It would be necessary for
Massachusetts to fund scientific research that supplants the Food
and Drug Administration’s 1992 Statement of Policy to succeed in
doing this.288 Therefore, leading-edge scientific conclusions could
be the key to the legal viability of House Bill 369 under Zauderer’s
less exacting scrutiny.289

288. Statement of Policy - Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg.
22984, 22991 (May 29, 1992). “The central role of the science community in funding
decisions diminishes when the broader community becomes involved in decisions on
the application of technology.” Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and
Science in America, 75 GEO. L. J. 1341, 1368 (1987).
289. Goldberg, supra note 288, at 1368 (“From the railroad to the automobile to
the airplane and beyond, legal doctrines have been shaped by technology and have, in
turn, shaped technology itself.”).

